This study examines the effects of governance mechanisms on CEO dismissal in different corporate cultures: manipulative (firms sued for financial misreporting) versus normal (non-sued firms). The findings show that, following the discovery of wrongdoings, "seemingly independent" boards are less effective in replacing the CEOs, whereas banks and blockholders increase the likelihood and lead to more prompt CEO dismissal. In underperforming non-sued firms, the presence of blockholders and bank borrowing has no effect on CEO turnover, but more independent boards increase the likelihood of CEO turnover. Corporate culture appears to be an important element in shaping the roles of governance mechanisms. Overall, these findings suggest that there is no need to impose specific percentage of board independence on firms.
Introduction
The parade of financial scandals at the beginning of the 21 st century prompted tightened rules and new regulations regarding corporate governance designed to re-establish the integrity of the market. Among them, the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002, the most significant securities legislation since 1934, marked the climax of such actions. Stock exchanges also revised their corporate governance requirements. In recent years, however, the tide has switched from demanding tighter regulations to easing regulatory constraints. In particular, new concerns centering on the competitiveness of U.S. capital markets raise the question of whether the new rules have imposed unnecessary burdens on publicly listed firms.
Several studies have examined the effect of SOX. Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007) argue that the benefit of listing in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has not been eroded because of SOX. However, other empirical studies have documented the unintended costs of SOX on corporations. 1 Zingales (2006) finds that global IPOs listed in the U.S. declined in recent years. Leuz, Triantis, and Wang (2006) show that the recent deregistration wave is associated with the enactment of SOX. Responding to these developments, Nasdaq launched a trading platform of private stock market, with the listing of about 500 firms on August 15, 2007. It does not require the filing of financial statements or the compliance of listing requirements and SOX.
2 Board independence is a major focus of recent governance reforms. The NYSE requires that listed companies have a majority of independent directors. Besides defining independent directors, the rules demand that the nomination/corporate governance and compensation committees have entirely independent directors. 3 From the outset, SOX requires that all members 1 For example, Zhang (2005) documents significantly negative market reactions to certain provisions of SOX. 2 "Nasdaq's Private Market Prepares a Timely Debut," the Wall Street Journal Online, August 14, 2007. 3 See NYSE Listed Company Manual for listing requirements. For a review of the advocates of board independence from various self-regulating organizations both in the U.S. and internationally, see Gupta and Fields (2004) .
of audit committee be independent. Linck, Netter, and Yang (2007) find that firms comply with the new rules by adding outsiders rather than removing insiders. There is also a dramatic increase in director fees for small firms. This study adds to the debate on the unintended consequences of new governance rules and asks the question of whether the board structure should be regulated.
This paper answers the above question by examining the effects of governance mechanisms in different corporate cultures to show that board independence can be window dressed if the firms have developed a manipulative culture. 4 Corporate culture is very difficult to define and has multiple dimensions. In this paper, I focus only on the specific manipulative culture related to financial reporting fraud, which, in a broad sense, can include reporting board independence by having "seemingly" independent directors. 5 Based on the fabricated board hypothesis, "seemingly independent" boards will be less effective in monitoring underperformers by replacing the CEOs, since the CEOs played an important role in shaping the boards in the first place. On the other hand, to protect their investments, banks and blockholders should increase CEO dismissal likelihood following disappointing financial results and/or the discovery of fraudulent misconduct.
As Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) point out, a key issue in examining board effect is how to proxy for the board's degree of independence from the CEO. However, it is difficult to 4 It is well known that board structure is endogenously determined and managers can influence the composition of boards (Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) ; Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) ). Using the opportunistic timing of outside directors' option grants, Bebchuk, Grinstein, and Peyer (2006) show that many outside directors are not only aware of the timing manipulation in the firms, they are part of it. In a Wall Street Journal article ("How Hefty Pay Raises, Undid an Insular Board," August 8, 2007) reporting the big raises and stock options to officers of Tennessee Commerce Bancorp, the author states "Regulations are no substitute for judgment and integrity by corporate directors." The incidence also results the resignation of three directors. One of them wrote in his resignation letter that "The executive officers/directors have concluded that the board can be manipulated in whatever manner deemed desirable… I have to question whether we are a board of directors --or a board of directed." 5 In other words, the number of independent directors is a noisy proxy for board independence because it contains both seemingly and truly independent directors depending on the level of manipulation in firms, then it explain the unstable or mixed findings of different studies.
measure such power and whether the CEOs have misused the power to advance their own interests. This paper partially resolves the problem by using the ex post observed financial scandals to classify firms into manipulative versus normal firms. These financial scandals are federal securities class action lawsuits alleging firms of misrepresenting financial information. 6 Managers in a firm that have developed a manipulative culture find it easier to exercise their power and orchestrate a series of actions that misrepresent the firm's financial condition. Thus, they have a greater incentive and need to fabricate board structure to their own interests.
Subsequently, it has a higher probability of being sued for fraudulent misreporting. The drastic stock price declines suggest that these CEOs misused their power at the expense of shareholders.
Conversely, normal firms with a less manipulative culture may select a director based on her expertise in facilitating decision making and safeguarding corporate mishaps regardless of whether she is an insider or outsider. However, everything else held constant, an independent outside director has less of a career concern within the firm but more of a reputational concern in the outside managerial-director market than an insider (Fama and Jensen (1983) ). Therefore, more independent boards are more effective in replacing CEO when it is in the firms' best interest to do so in normal firms. Non-sued firms are classified as having a normal corporate culture in this study. Of course, such a classification is far from perfect because of frivolous lawsuits and because some manipulative firms are not sued. 7 However, the misclassification is biased towards not finding different governance effects under different corporate cultures. 6 These lawsuits have been used in several studies as a proxy for fraudulent firms. Fich and Shivdasani (2007) and Helland (2006) use these lawsuits to examine directors' reputational losses. 7 To discourage frivolous securities fraud lawsuits, the U.S. Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) in 1995. Johnson, Nelson, and Pritchard (2004) find that accounting and insider trading variables significantly explain the incidence of litigation post-PSLRA but not prior to its passage and conclude that PSLRA discourages frivolous lawsuits.
CEO turnover is the most symbolic corporate reform. The decision to replace a CEO is also one of the most important tasks of boards. It is more easily observable than other strategic changes. Therefore, this study uses CEO replacement as a proxy for the effectiveness of various governance mechanisms in restructuring the firms. 8 It is defined by whether the incumbent CEO is replaced during the year or within three years following the day when the firm's alleged wrongdoings are uncovered. 9 The matching normal firms are all non-sued firms in the same industry based on two-digit SIC codes as the sued firms. Therefore, this study preserves the proportion of underlying sued/non-sued population at the industry level.
The evidence shows that, in a manipulative environment, a more independent board neither increases the likelihood of CEO dismissal nor replaces the CEO more promptly.
However, higher levels of bank loan stakes and highly concentrated outside blockholdings increase CEO turnover and promptness. 10 The findings are consistent with the fabricated board hypothesis. In normal firms, the presence of blockholders and bank borrowing has no effect on CEO turnover, but more independent boards increase the likelihood of CEO turnover, which is consistent with the notion of Fama and Jensen (1983) that board of directors is an important and the highest level of internal control mechanism. 11 Therefore, when director monitoring as the 8 Another possibility is to study CFO turnover. However, this measure may suffer from the problem that CFO indeed is the scapegoat of a powerful and manipulative CEO. 9 In each lawsuit filing, one can identify the so-call class period ending day, which is usually the time that firms' alleged wrongdoings are uncovered. If the governance mechanisms are working effectively, then one should expect some actions being taken before the public knows about the alleged fraudulent behaviors of managers. Therefore, the CEO turnover measure starts from the year of news breakout. However, the main findings are robust to the definition without the news breakout year. 10 The active role in corporate governance played by outside investors such as block holders and banks are consistent with extant empirical studies. For example, Kang and Shivdasani (1995) show that, in Japan, poorly performing firms with large shareholders have a higher tendency to replace managers than firms without them. Denis and Serrano (1996) document the same findings in US. Gilson (1990) finds that U.S. banks change managers and directors in bankrupt firms. Chen, Harford, and Li (2006) also provide evidence to show that institutional investors monitor firms when their holdings are concentrated.
11 The results are also in line with prior empirical findings that independent boards are effective in prompting firm changes (Weisbach (1988) (2003) . Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2005) find that some provisions of SOX may be detrimental to small firms. Small firms tend to have more insiders on the boards. As firms grow, the boards also become more independent (Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2007) turnover likelihood and firm performance. 13 Agrawal and Chadha (2005) find that board independence is unrelated to the likelihood of earnings restatements. It suggests that some firms may window dress their boards given the increased pressure from activists.
The conclusion of no need to regulate specific percentage of board independence is different from the claim of no need to promote board independence. What this study suggests is that market forces are more appropriate in promoting board independence. Regulation is less effective in reducing the incidence of fabricated boards. In addition, given the public attention to corporate governance, we may also see more seemingly independent directors on paper over time. To gauge such private "soft" information -identifying seemingly or truly independent directors -requires close interactions between firms and financial intermediaries. 14 This is exactly the job performed by various institutions in the markets. Although regulation is important, it has limitations particularly when the soft information is involved. The last thing that a sound financial system wants is having a regulation that constrains good firms but cannot do much about manipulative firms, which are the targets of recent governance reforms.
Besides the above contributions, the analysis of various governance mechanisms in different corporate environments also provides richer information on the roles of different mechanisms. It identifies corporate culture as an important element that shapes the roles of various governance mechanisms. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses financial scandals, governance reform, and board independence. Section 3 describes data and variables. Section 4 reports the results. Section 5 concludes.
13 However, using the event of Cadbury Committee in U.K., which recommends that the boards have at least 3 outside directors and separate the roles of chairman and CEO, Dahya, McConnell, and Travlos (2002) find that CEO turnover is more sensitive to firm performance among firms adopt the code. 14 Gonzalez and James (2006) use a sample of IPO firms to document banks' ability to select better firms. Graham, Li, and Qiu (2006) find that, following financial restatements, firms pay higher fees and loan spread and banks also used tighter loan contracts.
Financial Scandals, Governance Reform, and Board Independence

Financial scandals and governance reform
The surge of financial reporting fraud and accounting restatements following the burst of the Internet bubble has shaken the public confidence in U.S. corporate governance mechanisms.
Fraudulent firms have suffered from significant market value declines (see, for example, Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2006) and Karpoff and Loff (1993) Zenner (1997) find that target firms with more outside directors receive higher premium during the tender offer process because outside directors do a better job of negotiating on behalf of shareholders than do insiders. On the other hand, Byrd and Hickman (1992) show that firms with independent boards make better acquisitions than firms with insider-dominated boards. However, the effect is nonlinear suggesting the loss of such benefit if firms have too many independent directors. Paul (2006) also finds that more independent boards reduce the likelihood of completing bad bids, and the frequency of non-routine CEO turnover is positively associated with outside boards. Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2004) document that firms with more independent boards have better performance following CEO turnover.
Empirically, it is difficult to disentangle the monitoring effect of boards and endogenous quality of firms. Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) show that board independence increases after poor firm performance and a CEO change. 16 The same authors use a bargaining framework between the CEO and the board to explain the board dynamics, other board compositions, and CEO ownerships (Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) If CEOs in manipulative firms have chosen to misrepresent firms' financial conditions, they can also window dress the boards to perpetuate fraud and provide false signals of better internal governance. This action means that the number of independent outside directors is a noisy proxy for board independence because it includes both seemingly and truly independent directors, i.e., there is an error in variable problem. If the boards are fabricated in a manipulative environment, then it is unlikely that the seemingly independent boards would dismiss a CEO when firms underperform. In the event of mis-screening, outside monitors will be more effective 16 Denis and Sarin (1999) document similar findings. In addition, they also find that the higher the CEO stock ownership the smaller the changes of outside director proportion.
in replacing CEOs. Correcting insiders' opportunistic behavior to protect outsiders' own investments is an important function performed by financial institutions. Therefore, the fabricated board hypothesis predicts that seemingly independent boards will not increase the likelihood of CEO turnover, whereas outside monitors, such as blockholders and banks, will.
Besides resolving the error in variable problem, the separation of firms into normal and manipulative firms also solves the selection problem driven by the endogenous quality of firms,
i.e., honest versus opportunistic. One of the challenges regarding the study of the impact of outside monitors on firms is that the positive effect can be driven by the fact that either the outside monitors have selected better firms or the monitoring action has a positive effect on firms. Therefore, solely documenting the correlation between the presence of outside monitors and firm performance or corporate actions is not enough to establish the "additional" monitoring effect of outsiders beyond the selection effect. However, in this study, the quality of firms is known to some extent. If blockholders or banks can prompt changes in manipulative firms, such evidence can be interpreted as a monitoring function asserted by outside investors.
The actions of blockholders and banks are also used to contrast the effect of independent boards in manipulative firms. If there is a possibility that, under extreme circumstances, those
CEOs are required to stay and clean up the mess of litigations, then we should observe that blockholders, banks, and boards with more independent directors take the same action to reduce CEO turnover. Therefore, different actions between outside monitors and independent boards in manipulative firms can further fine-tune the test of the fabricated board hypothesis. It also jointly shows that the lawsuit proxy is a valid measure for manipulative corporate culture. Finally, the study also uses the Heckman selectivity model and the endogenous switching model to formally incorporate the lawsuit variable that defines manipulative versus normal firms as an endogenous variable in the analysis.
Data and Variables
The data used in this paper is from eight different sources. Securities class action lawsuits, which are the proxy for the manipulative corporate culture, are hand-collected from the website of Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse in cooperation with Cornerstone
Research. Board structure, some CEO characteristics, and governance index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) 
Sample selection
To be included in this study, the firms must have board structure and CEO characteristics during the fiscal year prior to the discovery of financial misreporting. Therefore, the sample starts from the joint set of firms in both Execucomp and IRRC. I hand-check the names of CEOs if they cannot be matched perfectly by using a computer and use only the firms for which CEOs can be identified and show consistent information in both databases. For example, the age of a CEO should be the same after considering slight misalignment of time periods between these two databases. Most of the information in Execucomp is mainly based on the end of the fiscal year, and it updates the age of executives to the most current year. However, IRRC records data based on shareholder meetings, which tend to come several months after the end of fiscal year and keep the historical ages of CEOs and directors.
Securities class actions lawsuits from 1996 to 2005 are used to identify which firms have been sued for misreporting financial information. If the firms have multiple lawsuits, I use only the first lawsuit incidence. Because the CEO turnover window is three years following the revelation of misconduct, the final sample contains firms sued during the period of 1996 to 2002.
The resulting manipulative subsample includes 265 unique firms.
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The matching normal firm subsample is not done by one-to-one matching, but by retaining all the non-sued firms having the same two-digit SIC codes as the sued firms during the year when the misconducts are first revealed. For example, if an industry has no firms sued during 1996, all firm observations in such a no-lawsuit industry in 1996 are not included in the study. For those industries with at least one sued firm in 1996, all firm observations in the sued industries in 1996 are used in the analysis. For the normal firms, there are eighteen firms reused for different years. Removing these firms does not change the results in any material way.
The advantage of this procedure is to control for industry effects and to construct a more economically relevant matching subsample without distorting the underlying distribution of sued/non-sued population. One of drawbacks of one-to-one matching is that the procedure artificially restricts the unconditional probability of being sued to be 50%, which is much higher than the industry controlled lawsuit probability of 29% found in this study. Panel A of Table 1 shows unusually high lawsuit incidences of 41% in 2001 following the burst of the Internet bubble.
This study uses two ways to define CEO turnover. Panel A of Table 1 reports the percentage of CEO turnover based on the focus of no CEO turnover. CEO turnover equals zero if the incumbent CEO (during the most recent fiscal year prior to the discovery of wrongdoing)
remains as the CEO of the company in the data after three years, one otherwise. This classification would include delisted firms as CEO turnover firms because there is no CEO information in the data after three years. The percentage of CEO turnover for normal firms is 45.7% and that for manipulative firms is 58.1%. Panel B of Table 1 reports the second definition, which requires firms to have CEO information available after three years and to see if the incumbent CEO is replaced. Because more normal firms become inactive after three years, the percentage of CEO turnover drops to 25.6%. The number for manipulative firms declines less dramatically to 51.1%. The true CEO turnover should be between these two definitions.
However, without public information on these delisted firms, one cannot fine tune the measure further. Therefore, the remedy is that I use both data sets to conduct analyses and find that both provide very similar estimates for CEO turnover analysis. In most of the cases, the restricted sample produces more significant results. Therefore, I report results using the sample of Panel A, which is the more conservative one.
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In a lawsuit filing, one can identify the "so-called" class period ending date, which tends to be the date that the news about a firm's wrongdoing is uncovered. It comes with a dramatic stock price decline surrounding this date. Thus, I use this date as the event date. Because eleven observations do not have class period ending dates, I use lawsuit filing dates as the event date. Table 2 shows that the average three-day cumulative market-adjusted (CSRP equally weighted index) abnormal returns surrounding the class period ending date is -24% and surrounding the lawsuit filing is -7%. Karpoff, Lee and Martin (2006) also document that significant adverse information is revealed prior to the lawsuit filing.
The average number of days between the class period ending and the lawsuit filing dates is 124 days, whereas the median is twenty days (Table 3 .5) days. From the zero to the third quarter, each quarter has about 25% of sued firms with the class period ending dates falling in that quarter. This explains the negative CARs for manipulative firms from the zero to the third quarters. Stakes of outside monitors are reported in Panel C of Table 4 . Compared to normal firms, a smaller proportion of manipulative firms have the presence of institutional investors and blockholders (holding greater than or equal to 5%), but the number of institutional investors is significantly larger. There is no difference between these two types of firms in terms of the level of institutional holdings, but the aggregate level of block holdings scaled by institutional holdings is lower for manipulative firms than for normal firms. These numbers suggest that institutional investor ownership is more concentrated in the normal firms than in the manipulative firms. Regarding bank monitoring, manipulative firms appear to have a higher percentage of short-term borrowing scaled by total assets (prior 3-year line of credit<1yr/ta*100) but a lower level of long-term loans (prior 3-year term loan/ta*100). Both short-term and long-term loan measures are aggregated amounts during three years prior to the event year. Banks tend to lend short-term if there is a higher need to monitor borrowers. The findings associated with bank lending suggest that, ex ante, banks require more frequent review of manipulative firms. Finally, manipulative firms issued more equity during the three years prior to the event year.
Summary statistics
Firm characteristics are reported in Table 5 . Many firm variables are used to control for the deep pocket effect to reduce the potential selection bias of using litigation as a proxy for manipulative culture. For example, sued (manipulative) firms are larger than normal firms in both total assets and market value of equity and have higher levels of cash holdings but lower profitability, even though the sales growth and three-year abnormal stock returns are much higher. Sued firms also have higher levels of information asymmetry because they have higher levels of R&D expenditures, Tobin's q, and smaller percentages of tangible assets than normal firms. Sued firms also have lower leverage and lower dividend yield.
Empirical Findings
Logistic regressions of lawsuit probability
The characteristics of manipulative firms are further analyzed in the logistic regressions.
The analysis is intended to be descriptive because the main focus of this paper is to study the effect of various governance mechanisms on CEO turnover in different corporate cultures. Table   6 reports results from both broader and restricted CEO turnover samples because the estimated statistical significance levels are different for four variables related to board structure and CEO characteristics, although all the estimates have the same signs between two CEO turnover definitions. Among the variables for board structure, only board independence is significantly positive. However, it is only significant for the restricted CEO turnover sample. The unstable result and lack of significant board structure variables to explain the incidence of financial misreporting litigation are consistent with the fabricated board hypothesis because if board structure can be manipulated, then it is unlikely that we will see differences between manipulative and normal firms along the dimensions of board structure. 19 The other three variables having different statistical significance levels between different CEO turnover definitions are CEO is also the chairman of the board, CEO age, and CEO stock ownership. In general, even if the estimates are statistically significant, they are only marginally.
Regardless of the sample used, unexercised stock option grants (ln(1+Black-Scholes option value)) do not increase the incentive to misrepresent financial information but significantly reduce such incentives. The results (not reported) are robust if the variable BlackScholes option value is scaled by total compensation (tdc1). 20 The presence of institutional investors significantly reduces the probability of firms misrepresenting financial information.
However, increasing the percentage of institutional ownership undoes this better selectivity of institutions, which can be attributed to the fact that the more institutions are invested in firms, the more serious the free-riding problem, which then reduces the incentive to monitor firms.
Manipulative firms have significantly higher proportion of short-term loans scaled by total assets (Prior 3-year (Line of credit<1yr)/ta*100), which suggests that when banks lend to manipulative firms prior to the discovery of wrongdoings, they demand more frequent reviews of firms for further lending decisions. The finding is consistent with the role of banks to screen borrowers. In 19 These results are different from those reported by Beasley (1996) and Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) . Both find that firms with more outside directors are less likely to commit accounting fraud. One possible explanation for these different findings is that, during the 1990's, the benefits of having independent directors have been advocated by academia and institutional activists, which may pressure certain firms to window dress their boards more than ever. Therefore, the board independence measure becomes noisier in the recent sample period. 20 Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2006) study 50 firms accused of accounting fraud by the SEC and find no systematic evidence that links equity-based compensation to accounting fraud. However, their sample size is much smaller than that of this study.
terms of the control variables reported in Table 6 , manipulative firms appear to be larger, having higher levels of capital and R&D expenditure, sales growth, three-year abnormal stock returns, but having lower percentages of tangible assets scaled by total assets. These firms tend to be on the path of high investment and growth. However, the investment is more intangible, and therefore, has a larger information asymmetry problem.
CEO turnover: corporate cultures and governance mechanisms
In this section, I analyze the impact of various governance mechanisms on CEO turnover in different corporate cultures -manipulative versus normal. Because the results using the restricted CEO turnover definition (see Appendix A) are similar to or more significant than those using the broader CEO turnover definition, this paper mainly reports and discusses the results from the broader definition. The short-term stock reaction to lawsuit filing and the interaction term between stock performance and independent board dummy does not change the main findings, so Appendix A reports the estimates without this interaction term to show the robustness of the results. Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2007) . They study CEO replacement of firms that are subjected to the SEC and Department of Justice enforcement actions for financial misrepresentation. Their sample period starts from 1978, which is much earlier than this paper. Therefore, as footnote 18 has discussed, the earlier period may have a smaller fabricated board problem. So the measure of board independence is less noisy in their study. Another possible explanation is the firm size. The median market value for manipulative firms in this paper is $3.2 billion. However, that for their CEO replaced sample is $50.6 million. Larger firms are subjected to more scrutiny from the public and activists, therefore, have a higher incentive to window dress their boards. the probability increase of CEO turnover is lower for line of credit, it is still a significant 9.7%
corresponding to a one standard deviation increase. In contrast, none of the outside monitor variables are significant for normal firms. These findings further reinforce the fabricated board hypothesis because if the CEOs of manipulative firms should stay and deal with the litigations, then we should see both independent directors and outside monitors behave in the same manner.
However, they do not. 
Robustness tests and controlling for endogenous selection
In this section, I address several concerns regarding frivolous lawsuits, firm size, forced CEO turnover, and endogenous selection. Models (2) and (3) It is possible that the endogenous selection drives the negative estimate of independent directors in manipulative firms and contaminates the estimate, so it is different from the positive estimate in normal firms. Model (4) in Panel A of Table 7 uses the Heckman selectivity model Heckman (1979) to control for endogenous selection driven by lawsuit events. Several firm characteristics that are significant in explaining lawsuit incidences, such as capital expenditures, R&D expenditures, and tangible assets, are used as valid instrumental variables because they are not related to CEO turnover decision. The high significance level of these variables in the lawsuit regressions warrants that they are strong instruments. 22 The main results remain robust.
Because the firms are sorted into two different regimes, manipulative and normal, another model can be used to control for endogenous selection is switching regressions with endogenous switching (also known as the endogenous switching model). 23 The model is defined in Appendix B, which also reports the estimates. Again, the main findings are robust when both subsamples are estimated simultaneously. The estimates on endogenous selection controls show that these equations are not independent as the significant χ 2 statistic of 9.64 indicates. In particular, the unobservable factor of CEO turnover and that of corporate culture are positively correlated ( 1 ρ is significantly positive) in the manipulative regime. Therefore, there is endogenous selection for the manipulative firms but not for the normal firms.
The findings in normal firms indicates that board of directors is the main governance mechanism that affect CEO turnover decisions whereas blockholdings and banks do not involved in such a decision. However, to make the subsample of non-sued firms more comparable to sued firms, several robustness tests are reported in Panel B of Table 7 . The main findings are robust for all the additional tests. In Model (2) of Panel B, only CEOs who are younger than 66 years old are included to reduce the noise of normal retirement. Model (3) focuses on larger normal firms with above median total assets because sued firms tend to be larger. Model (4) includes only underperformers with below median three-year cumulative abnormal stock returns. 22 The convention for strong instrumental variables is that the F-test has to exceed the value of 10 (Staiger and Stock (1997)). Using a linear probability model to reexamine the lawsuit regression shows that these variables jointly have an F-statistic of 11.7. Note that logit regressions do not provide F-statistics but χ 2 statistics for the test of significance of variables. The χ 2 statistics which has a value of 51.51 with a degree of freedom of 7 for these instrumental variables is highly significant, too. The test of validity of instrumental variables is conducted by regressing the residuals of CEO turnover regressions in Table 8 on the instrumental variables. The insignificant Fstatistics of 1.25 (p-value of 0.27) indicates that these instrumental variables do not explain CEO turnover decision. 23 See Maddala (1983) for more discussions of this model.
CEO replacement time
To further examine the robustness of the main findings, this section analyzes how fast manipulative firms replace their CEOs. Because there is no event date for a normal firm, I cannot calculate the window for a normal firm to replace its CEO from the discovery of wrongdoings.
Therefore, only manipulative firms are analyzed in this section. Because the replacement time for normal firms is missing, I use the Heckman selectivity model to control for endogenous selection (Heckman (1979)). Model (1) in Table 9 reports the base model without the control for endogenous selection. Model (2) considers the potential endogenous selection related to the incidence of lawsuits, while Model (3) considers the endogenous selection related to the decision of CEO turnover. None of the endogeneity controls are significant, so there is no need to control for endogenous selection in the CEO replacement time regressions. Therefore, the results are very similar among these three models.
The estimates on independent directors again are consistent with the fabricated board hypothesis. The significantly positive estimates mean that more independent boards indeed increase the time to replace CEO in manipulative firms. An increase of one standard deviation of board independence (0.17) increases the replacement time by 0.23 year (1.36x0.17), which is nearly a quarter. The result is different from that of Ertugrul and Krishnan (2007) , who also study CEO replacement time. They find that board independence has no effect on early/late replacement. However, their study is different from this paper in two ways. First, they do not isolate firms based on corporate cultures. Second, they do not have specific event dates.
CEOs who hold multiple operational positions also take longer to be dismissed. Older
CEOs are replaced faster. Firms with institutional blockholders replace CEOs later, but highly concentrated blockholdings significantly shorten the replacement time. Short-term loans (lines of credit) have no effect on CEO replacement time, but larger long-term loans (term loans) significantly reduce the CEO dismissal time. The findings suggest that banks have a higher incentive to prompt changes in firms when the long-term loans are at risk, whereas short-term lines of credit can be canceled or will not be renewed in the case that the firms resist such changes. Again, these results are consistent with the fabricated board hypothesis.
Conclusions
This study provides empirical evidence to show that board structure can be fabricated if a firm has developed a manipulative culture. Consistent with the fabricated board hypothesis, more independent boards in manipulative firms are ineffective in monitoring managers and do not increase the likelihood of CEO dismissal following the discovery of financial misreporting. In such firms, highly concentrated blockholdings and bank loan stakes provide disciplinary forces that increase the probability of CEO turnover and reduce the time to replace CEOs significantly.
On the contrary, in normal firms, more independent boards increase the likelihood of CEO replacement. The CEO turnover probability is also more sensitive to stock performance in normal firms with independent director dominated boards. Outside investors do not affect CEO turnover decisions in normal firms. These results suggest that normal firms rely on internal governance mechanisms, such as board monitoring, while outside investors mainly act as capital providers. Nonetheless, in manipulative firms, board structure can be fabricated. Therefore, outside investors, such as blockholders and banks, are more effective monitors.
The main conclusions in this study imply that there is no need to regulate board structure by imposing specific percentage of board independence because the manipulative firms, which are the main targets of such regulations, can and have window dressed their boards. It may be more efficient to leave the job to those financial institutions because they are supposed to seek out the private soft information during the screening stage on how independent the boards are before they invest their capital. In case of false screening, these investors are also more effective monitors than the fabricated boards because the monetary stakes involved in the firms would provide incentives to prompt changes and monitor the firms more closely. is used to ensure that the normal firms remain non-sued during the CEO turnover period. The broader definition of CEO turnover is based on the focus of no CEO turnover if the incumbent CEO during the most recent fiscal year prior to the discovery of wrongdoing remains as the CEO of the company in the data after 3 years. This classification would include delisted firms or missing observations after 3 years as CEO turnover firms because there is no CEO information in the data after 3 years. Total debt is defined as total liability (Compustat data 181) + preferred stock (data 10 or 56 if data 10 is not available) + deferred taxes (data 35). Tobin's q is defined as (total debt + market value of equity) / total assets. Leverage is defined as total debt / (total debt + market value of equity). CRSP equally weighted stock index is used to calculated 3-year cumulative abnormal stock returns, which is the sum of monthly abnormal returns over 36 months prior to the end of fiscal year. The endogenous switching model (also known as switching regressions with endogenous switching model) is defined as follows: ρ . The above three equations are estimated simultaneously using maximum likelihood method. Independent board equals 1 if the percentage of independent directors is equal to or above the median number of 66.7%. For brevity, the estimates of the corporate culture selection equation (i.e., lawsuit probability) are not reported. The results are similar to those in Table 6 . Thus, only the CEO turnover estimates for both manipulative and normal regimes are reported in this table. The number of observations is 870. The overall log likelihood of this three-equation model is -879.79. Note that the stock price reaction upon lawsuit filing is not available for normal firms, so this variable is not included in the analysis.
Manipulative firms
Normal firms Log likelihood ratio test of independent equations : chi2(1) = 9.64; P-value = 0.002 * , ** , *** Significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively, for a two-tailed test.
Table 1 Sample distribution by year
Panel A presents the full sample containing manipulative firms sued for alleged financial misreporting during the period of 1996 to 2002. The matching normal firms are all non-sued firms in the same industries (classified by 2-digit SIC codes) as the sued firms. Lawsuit information from 1996 to 2005 is used to ensure that the normal firms remain non-sued during the CEO turnover period. The definition of CEO turnover (broader CEO turnover) is based on the focus of no CEO turnover if the incumbent CEO during the most recent fiscal year prior to the discovery of wrongdoing remains as the CEO of the company in the data after 3 years. This classification would include delisted firms or missing observations after 3 years as CEO turnover firms because there is no CEO information in the data after 3 years. Panel B reports the second definition of CEO turnover (restricted CEO turnover), which requires that CEO information is still available after 3 years. If the incumbent CEO is replaced by a new CEO, then this is a CEO turnover firm; if the incumbent CEO firm remains in the company after 3 years, then this is a no-CEO turnover firm. The row with the heading of "inactive" reports the firms that are no longer active in Compustat as of 2006. The main findings are robust to both CEO turnover definitions. The sample contains manipulative firms sued for alleged financial misreporting during the period from 1996 to 2002. In each lawsuit filing, the time period covering the alleged misconduct is defined as the class period. Usually, the end of class period is also the day that alleged wrongdoing is revealed. Daily CSRP equally weighted stock index adjusted abnormal returns are cumulated based on the corresponding windows. , *** Significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively, for a two-tailed test.
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Table 3 Number of days between events and reason for litigation
The sample contains manipulative firms sued for alleged financial misreporting during the period from 1996 to 2002. Panel A reports the number of days between events. In each lawsuit filing, the time period covering the alleged misconduct is defined as the class period. Usually, the end of the class period is also the day that alleged wrongdoing is revealed. Panel B reports the reasons that firms were sued. The reasons are not mutually exclusive because a firm can be sued for more than one reason. The sample contains 260 manipulative firms with stock returns information sued for alleged financial misreporting during the period from 1996 to 2002. The matching normal firms (636 observations) are all non-sued firms in the same industries (classified by 2-digit SIC codes) as the sued firms. Lawsuit information from 1996 to 2005 is used to ensure that the normal firms remain non-sued during the CEO turnover period. CRSP equally weighted stock index is used to calculated quarterly cumulative abnormal stock returns, which is the sum of monthly abnormal returns over 3 months for each quarter. The event quarter 0 is the most recent fiscal year end quarter prior to the discovery of manipulative firms' wrongdoings.
N Mean Median
Table 4 Governance mechanisms and CEO attributes
The sample contains manipulative firms sued for alleged financial misreporting during the period from 1996 to 2002. The matching normal firms are all non-sued firms in the same industries (classified by 2-digit SIC codes) as the sued firms. Lawsuit information from 1996 to 2005 is used to ensure that the normal firms remain non-sued during the CEO turnover period. Tests of differences between normal and manipulative firms are ttests for means and Wilcoxon rank test for medians. Significant levels of differences in means and medians are reported under the heading of manipulative.
Normal ( , *** Significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively, for a two-tailed test.
Table 5 Firm characteristics
The sample contains manipulative firms sued for alleged financial misreporting during the period from 1996 to 2002. The matching normal firms are all non-sued firms in the same industries (classified by 2-digit SIC codes) as the sued firms. Lawsuit information from 1996 to 2005 is used to ensure that the normal firms remain non-sued during the CEO turnover period. Total debt is defined as total liability (Compustat data 181) + preferred stock (data 10 or 56 if data 10 is not available) + deferred taxes (data 35). Tobin's q is defined as (total debt + market value of equity) / total assets. Leverage is defined as total debt / (total debt + market value of equity). CRSP equally weighted stock index is used to calculated 3-year cumulative abnormal stock returns, which is the sum of monthly abnormal returns over 36 months prior to the end of fiscal year. Tests of differences between normal and manipulative firms are t-tests for means and Wilcoxon rank test. Significant levels of differences in means and medians are reported under the heading of manipulative. , *** Significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively, for a two-tailed test. Table 6 Logistic regression and marginal effect of lawsuit probability
Normal
The sample contains manipulative firms sued for alleged financial misreporting during the period of 1996 to 2002. The matching normal firms are all non-sued firms in the same industries (classified by 2-digit SIC codes) as the sued firms. Lawsuit information from 1996 to 2005 is used to ensure that the normal firms remain non-sued during the CEO turnover period. In model (1), the definition of CEO turnover (broader CEO turnover) is based on the focus of no CEO turnover if the incumbent CEO during the most recent fiscal year prior to the discovery of wrongdoing remains as the CEO of the company in the data after 3 years. This classification would include delisted firms or missing observations after 3 years as CEO turnover firms because there is no CEO information in the data after 3 years. Model (2) uses the restricted definition of CEO turnover, which requires that CEO information is still available after 3 years. If the incumbent CEO is replaced by a new CEO, then this is a CEO turnover firm; if the incumbent CEO firm remains in the company after 3 years, then this is a no-CEO turnover firm. Total debt is defined as total liability (Compustat data 181) + preferred stock (data 10 or 56 if data 10 is not available) + deferred taxes (data 35). Tobin's q is defined as (total debt + market value of equity) / total assets. Leverage is defined as total debt / (total debt + market value of equity). CRSP equally weighted stock index is used to calculated 3-year cumulative abnormal stock returns, which is the sum of monthly abnormal returns over 36 months prior to the end of fiscal year. The column "dy/dx" reports marginal effect evaluated at mean values of explanatory variables.
(1) Broader CEO turnover sample (2) Restricted CEO turnover sample This table reports the effects of various governance mechanisms on CEO turnover probability in different corporate environments. Panel A shows the marginal effect on CEO turnover probability in manipulative corporate culture. The manipulative subsample contains firms sued for alleged financial misreporting during the period of 1996 to 2002. Panel B shows the marginal effect on CEO turnover probability in non-sued firms, which proxy for non-manipulative (normal) corporate environment. The matching normal firms are all non-sued firms in the same industries (classified by 2-digit SIC codes) as the sued firms. Lawsuit information from 1996 to 2005 is used to ensure that the normal firms remain non-sued during the CEO turnover period. Logistic regression is conducted for each subsample. However, for brevity, the table only presents the marginal effect evaluated at the mean value of each explanatory variable. The broader definition of CEO turnover is based on the focus of no CEO turnover if the incumbent CEO during the most recent fiscal year prior to the discovery of wrongdoing remains as the CEO of the company in the data after 3 years. This classification would include delisted firms or missing observations after 3 years as CEO turnover firms because there is no CEO information in the data after 3 years. Independent board equals to 1 if the percentage of independent directors is equal to or above the median number of 66.7%. Total debt is defined as total liability (Compustat data 181) + preferred stock (data 10 or 56 if data 10 is not available) + deferred taxes (data 35). Tobin's q is defined as (total debt + market value of equity) / total assets. Leverage is defined as total debt / (total debt + market value of equity). CRSP equally weighted stock index is used to calculated 3-year cumulative abnormal stock returns (CARs), which is the sum of monthly abnormal returns over 36 months prior to the end of fiscal year. CRSP equally weighted stock index is also used to calculated stock reaction to lawsuit filing CAR [-2,2] , which is the sum of five days abnormal returns surrounding lawsuit filing (day 0). Several robustness tests are conducted for each subsample. To mitigate the noise of frivolous lawsuits, in Panel A, Model (2), the sample only contains firms with below or equal to median value of stock reaction to lawsuit filing (CAR[-2,2]<=-3.86%). Model (4) of Panel A presents the results of probit regression with Heckman selectivity control, which treat lawsuit filing as an endogenous event. The 2 χ test of endogenous selection is significant at the 13% level. For normal firms in Panel B, Model (2) analyzes firms with CEO age less than or equal to 65 to reduce the possibility of CEO turnover due to retirement. Model (3) includes firms with above median total assets to address the firm size concerns that sued firms tend to be larger than non-sued firms. Model (4) examines only underperforming firms with below and equal to median three-year CARs.
( This table reports the estimates of CEO replacement time, which is the number of years between the class period ending date (the date wrongdoings are uncovered) and the CEO replacement date. The sample contains manipulative firms sued for alleged financial misreporting during the period of 1996 to 2002. Because the analysis requires the date of a new CEO taking office, only the restricted definition of CEO turnover is used, which requires that CEO information is available after 3 years. Total debt is defined as total liability (Compustat data 181) + preferred stock (data 10 or 56 if data 10 is not available) + deferred taxes (data 35). Tobin's q is defined as (total debt + market value of equity) / total assets. Leverage is defined as total debt / (total debt + market value of equity). CRSP equally weighted stock index is used to calculated 3-year cumulative abnormal stock returns, which is the sum of monthly abnormal returns over 36 months prior to the end of fiscal year. Model (1) is the base OLS regression. Model (2) is estimated using Heckman selection model controlling for the potential endogenous selection of corporate culture. Model (3) is estimated using Heckman selection model controlling for the potential endogenous selection of CEO turnover. For brevity, the estimates of selection equations are not reported.
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